The U.S. midterm elections concluded on November 3, 2026. The Democratic Party gained control of both chambers of Congress and won key gubernatorial races in states such as Texas, Georgia, and Ohio. As the United States moves into divided government in January 2027, the federal government’s ability to advance military and energy policies, along with state governments’ approach to regulating large AI data centers, has become an important factor in how markets assess investment in energy and technology infrastructure.

The elections are expected to affect energy markets in two main ways:
First, Democratic control of Congress is likely to raise the political cost of continuing the Trump administration’s war with Iran and seeking additional military funding. This may lead markets to reassess how long the conflict will last. Although major differences remain between the United States and Iran in negotiations, mounting pressure over military spending and congressional oversight could increase Washington’s incentive to pursue a diplomatic breakthrough. If the two sides gradually reach a ceasefire agreement in the first half of 2027, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and Middle Eastern oil exports could return to normal, causing geopolitical risk premiums to ease and oil prices to fall.
Second, local governments are taking a more cautious approach to regulating large data centers, particularly over electricity costs, water use, and community engagement. Most major projects expected to come online in 2027 are already under construction, so the direct near-term impact on supply-chain shipments is likely to be limited. Projects planned for 2028 that are still awaiting approval or in the planning stage face greater schedule uncertainty. Tighter regulations could also prompt cloud service providers (CSPs) to invest more in self-generation and energy storage to reduce their reliance on the public grid, supporting demand for behind-the-meter power, fuel cells, energy storage, and energy-management equipment.
Overall, the key driver of the oil market is likely to shift from geopolitical risk to the pace of supply recovery. For AI power infrastructure, the focus is likely to move beyond expanding capacity and toward securing power, navigating project approvals, and managing electricity costs.
Oil Markets: Congressional Constraints Could Increase the Incentive to Negotiate, with a Potential Price Turning Point in 1H27
Divided Government Raises the Cost of Prolonged Conflict; Congressional Budget Review Becomes a Key Constraint
The Democratic Party won majorities in both chambers of Congress in the midterm elections, while Republicans retained the White House. The United States will therefore enter a period of divided government in January 2027. Although the president retains military command authority and a degree of latitude in foreign policy, defense budgets, additional war funding, and related military authorizations remain subject to congressional oversight. The political and financial costs of continuing the Trump administration’s military campaign against Iran are therefore likely to rise.
The war with Iran has already required substantial U.S. spending on military deployments, weapons replenishment, and logistics. If the conflict continues into 2027, the executive branch will face greater pressure in negotiating the defense budget. Democrats could make it more difficult for the administration to expand military operations through budget reviews, conditions attached to appropriations, congressional oversight, and procedures related to war powers. However, the transfer of congressional control would not immediately end existing military operations. The president could still use current funding and executive authority to maintain a degree of military presence.
Divided government is therefore unlikely to force an immediate U.S. withdrawal. Its main effect would be to raise the political cost of prolonging the war, increasing the administration’s incentive to seek a diplomatic solution. Budget negotiations at the end of 2026 and the new Congress’s start in early 2027 will be important points to watch for signs of a shift in U.S. policy toward Iran.
Significant Differences Remain Over the Order of Negotiations, Pointing to a Near-Term Stalemate

Despite the shift in the U.S. political environment, the two sides remain far apart on key issues, including Iran’s nuclear program, economic sanctions, access through the Strait of Hormuz, and the terms of a ceasefire. A comprehensive agreement is therefore unlikely in the near term. Iran is currently calling for the United States to first lift its naval blockade of Iranian ports, ease economic sanctions, release frozen assets, and provide security guarantees before moving on to discussions about limits on its nuclear program and international inspections. The United States, by contrast, is demanding that Iran first ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz and make substantive concessions on uranium enrichment, its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, and inspection mechanisms before Washington considers easing sanctions.
| Issue | United States | Iran |
|---|---|---|
| Naval blockade and the Strait of Hormuz | Demands safe, unrestricted passage through the Strait of Hormuz and rejects unilateral Iranian control of the waterway or the imposition of transit fees | Demands that the United States lift its naval blockade first |
| Economic sanctions and assets | Unwilling to lift sanctions in full or release assets unconditionally before Iran makes substantive concessions on its nuclear program | Demands that the United States first lift sanctions, restore oil exports, and release frozen overseas assets |
| Nuclear program | Demands limits on Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity, action on its highly enriched uranium stockpile, and the restoration of international inspections | Rejects giving up its right to uranium enrichment and nuclear technology, but remains open to discussing the dilution of some enriched uranium |
| Ceasefire and security guarantees | Unwilling to fully include Israel’s military operations on other fronts in a U.S.–Iran ceasefire, or to provide comprehensive security guarantees before progress is made on the nuclear issue | Demands a ceasefire across all fronts, including the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and guarantees that the United States will not attack Iran again |
| War reparations | Rejects Iran’s demand for reparations | Seeks compensation from the United States for war-related damage |
The main differences concern the order of negotiations and guarantees that each side will honor an agreement. Iran wants to secure economic concessions and security assurances first, while the United States wants Iran to address its nuclear program and maritime security first. Since making the first concession could weaken its leverage in later negotiations, neither side has a strong incentive to compromise unilaterally.
Qatar and other countries have continued to facilitate diplomacy, indicating that communication channels remain open. However, without concrete enforcement mechanisms and assurances of reciprocal compliance, the two sides are more likely in the near term to maintain a mix of limited military pressure and diplomatic engagement than to reach a comprehensive ceasefire quickly.
Base Case: Conflict Gradually Eases in 1H27, Bringing Oil Prices Back Toward Supply-and-Demand Fundamentals
In the near term, significant differences remain between the United States and Iran over the nuclear program, economic sanctions, access through the Strait of Hormuz, and ceasefire terms. Neither side is willing to make the first concession, so the war is more likely to remain in a stalemate. However, a major escalation by the United States would require additional military funding and resources. It could also trigger retaliation from Iran and regional proxy forces, potentially widening the conflict and affecting other Middle Eastern oil producers and energy infrastructure. That, in turn, would raise the cost of sustaining the war for Washington.
Given that neither side currently has much incentive to make concessions, a major renewed escalation appears unlikely. The conflict is more likely to remain at an impasse, with military pressure and diplomatic efforts continuing in parallel. As the war drags on, however, the United States will continue to bear the costs of military deployments, weapons replenishment, and operations. After the new Congress takes office in January 2027, the Trump administration would face congressional scrutiny and budget negotiations if it sought additional funding to continue military operations against Iran. With political divisions deepening and the costs of the war continuing to accumulate, securing additional funding could become more difficult, further limiting the United States’ ability to sustain the conflict over the long term. The most likely scenario is therefore that Trump maintains the current stalemate in the short term, then faces growing political pressure over additional military funding and continued operations after the new Congress takes office in January 2027. This would give Washington greater incentive to adjust its position and pursue a breakthrough in negotiations, gradually moving both sides toward a ceasefire. If the Strait of Hormuz blockade is subsequently lifted and oil exports and shipping return to normal, concerns about Middle Eastern supply disruptions should gradually ease, causing geopolitical risk premiums to unwind. Oil prices are most likely to fall in the first half of 2027.
| Scenario | Key assumptions | Impact on oil prices |
|---|---|---|
| Base case: Gradual easing in 1H27 | The conflict remains at an impasse in the near term. After the new Congress takes office and military costs rise, both sides gradually seek a ceasefire and a return to normal shipping | Risk premiums gradually unwind, putting oil prices on a downward trend |
| Early de-escalation: Breakthrough before the end of 2026 | The United States and Iran reach an agreement on some ceasefire, shipping, and sanctions conditions ahead of schedule | Risk premiums unwind faster, and oil prices fall earlier |
| Escalation: High oil prices persist beyond 1H27 | Negotiations break down and military operations expand, affecting regional oil facilities and shipping | Supply-disruption risks rise, keeping oil prices elevated or pushing them higher again |
Congressional constraints should be viewed as an incentive for the United States to adjust its policy, not as a sufficient condition for a ceasefire. The factors that will ultimately determine whether oil prices continue to fall include actual shipping conditions through the Strait of Hormuz, the pace of Middle Eastern oil production recovery, and the outcome of U.S.–Iran negotiations.
If the Conflict Eases, Gasoline and Crude Prices May Fall First, While Diesel Prices Remain Supported
By product, the global crude supply deficit has gradually narrowed as supply rebounded in the third quarter. The market is expected to move closer to balance in the fourth quarter. If the U.S.–Iran conflict gradually eases in the first half of 2027, restored shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and a recovery in Middle Eastern oil exports would further improve global crude supply. The market could shift back to a surplus, putting downward pressure on crude prices.
- Gasoline: Gasoline production on the U.S. Gulf Coast has gradually recovered, leaving overall supply more ample than in the diesel market. Although gasoline inventories remain relatively low, improving crude supply and the recovery of refining capacity should gradually ease supply pressure and pull prices down alongside crude.
- Diesel: Supply may recover more slowly. The conflict in the Middle East forced some refineries to shut down or reduce operations, cutting output by nearly half from its peak. Even if the United States and Iran reach a ceasefire, reopening the Strait of Hormuz would improve crude transportation relatively quickly, but restarting refineries, completing maintenance, and restoring capacity would take longer. Diesel supply is therefore unlikely to return to pre-war levels at the same pace. In addition, U.S. domestic demand and exports continue to absorb new supply, preventing it from translating into a meaningful inventory recovery. Diesel prices should remain relatively well supported and may be slow to fall in the short term even if negotiations progress.
| EIA oil price forecast | 4Q26 | 1Q27 | 2Q27 | 3Q27 | 4Q27 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil (Brent) | 104.69 | 94.9 | 87 | 80.03 | 73.79 |
| Crude oil (WTI) | 97 | 90.9 | 83 | 76.03 | 69.94 |
| Gasoline | 3.27 | 2.84 | 2.77 | 2.57 | 2.24 |
| Diesel | 4.23 | 3.57 | 3.12 | 2.92 | 2.82 |
AI Power Infrastructure: Limited Impact on 2027 Shipments, but Regulatory Risks to New Capacity in 2028
Key Markets Such as Texas Tighten Oversight, Making Data Center Approvals a Major Policy Risk
Following the U.S. midterm elections, the political landscape shifted in key data center markets such as Texas, Georgia, and Ohio. Markets are reassessing approval thresholds and development costs for large AI infrastructure projects.
Texas’s policy shift is particularly important. Governor-elect Gina Hinojosa called during her campaign for a pause on approvals for new data center projects until the state legislature passes laws protecting residents’ electricity costs, water resources, and community interests. Given Texas’s importance as a data center market, a prolonged pause, if implemented, would increase development risks for projects that have not yet secured the required permits.
Across the states, local governments are focusing data center regulations on three main areas:
- Requiring developers to pay the grid-expansion costs associated with new electricity demand, rather than passing them on to residents
- Raising the standards for reviewing water use, environmental impacts, and community engagement
- Reassessing tax incentives and subsidy terms for large data centers
| Democratic state / governor | Core position | Key conditions |
|---|---|---|
| Texas — Hinojosa | Pause approvals for new projects until legislation is passed; does not oppose AI development | Must show that grid and water-system upgrade costs will not be shifted to residents; ban nondisclosure agreements (NDAs); use union labor; allow communities to participate in decisions on whether and how projects are built |
| Pennsylvania — Shapiro | Supports development with strict safeguards; an August executive order implemented GRID standards and ended expedited permitting | Submit an energy assurance letter and obtain local approval before construction; do not raise electricity prices; state tax incentives must meet “responsible development” standards |
| Ohio — Acton | Conditional pause on large projects until an assessment of their long-term external impacts is completed | Developers cover all utility costs; use union labor; ban NDAs; tighten long-term tax incentives |
| Georgia — Bottoms | Calls for a pause on new data centers; the Public Service Commission (PSC) has also shifted to a Democratic majority | Assess community, environmental, and electricity-bill impacts before deciding whether to approve projects; as Atlanta mayor, previously approved financing and tax breaks for the Coda data center |
| Illinois — Pritzker | Since July 1, paused new agreements under state investment programs until the POWER Act framework is completed | Create a separate electricity-rate classification for data centers; build or pay for clean energy; curtail power use when the grid is strained; improve energy and water efficiency; ban NDAs |
| Arizona — Hobbs | Opposes the attorney general’s proposal for a statewide pause; frozen applications for new tax incentives for three years | Establish statewide water and electricity standards; developers cover their own costs and must not raise residents’ electricity bills |
| Michigan — Benson | Shifted from calling data centers a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” to supporting a pause until safeguards are in place | Developers must build new generation for the communities they enter; hold mandatory public hearings; use union labor; disclose energy and water impacts |
| Wisconsin — Crowley | Shifted position in the final two weeks before the election: pause construction in Port Washington during an environmental review | Eliminate the sales tax exemption, which has resulted in more than $2 billion in foregone state tax revenue; require 100% renewable energy; cover all grid-upgrade costs; ban NDAs |
| New Mexico — Haaland | Plans to issue an executive order immediately upon taking office to pause new large data centers | Build renewable energy, such as geothermal; prioritize local hiring; no state subsidies before safeguards are in place; counties may ban projects entirely |
| Virginia — Spanberger | Will not impose a pause, but plans to strengthen state oversight; issued an executive order on September 18 | Data centers must cover the full cost of dedicated transmission lines; facilities over 25 MW will no longer receive automatic approval; levy an electricity consumption tax of 1.1¢/kWh |
These positions should be distinguished by whether they are campaign promises, administrative measures already in effect, or formal legislation. Their actual impact will depend on the scope of future state regulations, available exemptions, and effective dates. Overall, U.S. data center policy is shifting from a focus on attracting investment through tax incentives toward requiring developers to bear more of the costs of additional energy and infrastructure. These policies do not necessarily signal weaker data center demand, but they could raise the bar for new projects and delay the conversion of capital spending into equipment orders.
| Category | Related stocks |
|---|---|
| Server and data center power supply units (PSUs) | Delta Electronics (2308.TW), Lite-On (2301.TW), Vertiv (VRT) |
| UPS and backup power | Vertiv (VRT), Eaton (ETN), Schneider Electric (SU), Delta Electronics (2308) |
| Battery backup units (BBUs) | Vertiv (VRT), Eaton (ETN), Dynapack (3211.TW), STL (4931.TW), AES-KY (6781.TW) |
For suppliers such as Delta Electronics, Lite-On, and Vertiv, near- and medium-term shipments will continue to depend mainly on construction progress, equipment acceptance, and delivery schedules for existing projects. If state governments extend approval timelines for new projects, however, orders for PSUs, UPS systems, BBUs, and power-management equipment for some 2028 data centers could be delayed.
On the other hand, if newly elected governors clarify regulatory standards after taking office in early 2027—including rules on electricity-cost allocation, power access, water restrictions, and approval processes—uncertainty could ease and previously delayed projects could resume. Investors should therefore look beyond whether regulations are tightening and assess their actual impact on project viability and construction schedules.
Developers Covering Grid Costs Could Make BYOG and BYOP More Common

One of the main aims of local data center regulation is to prevent the rapid expansion of large AI infrastructure from raising household electricity bills or overburdening public grids. Governments are increasingly requiring developers to bear the costs of additional grid capacity, transmission, and energy supply.
This trend gives CSPs and data center developers a stronger incentive to secure power directly through Build Your Own Generation (BYOG) and Bring Your Own Power (BYOP) models, reducing their reliance on additional capacity from the public grid. Options for self-generation or independently arranged power include natural-gas turbines, fuel cells, renewable energy, and energy storage. Some facilities may also adopt behind-the-meter configurations to reduce their dependence on external grid power.
Overall, growth in data center power investment may expand beyond drawing more electricity from public grids to include self-generation, backup power, and integrated energy-management systems.
Renewable Energy and Storage Complement Each Other, Supporting Further Growth in BESS and EMS Demand
Compared with Republicans, who place greater emphasis on conventional energy development—including oil, natural gas, and coal—Democrats have long been more inclined to support climate policy, the energy transition, and net-zero emissions. They favor accelerating renewable energy development through policy subsidies, tax incentives, and infrastructure investment. According to a 2026 Pew Research Center survey, around 83% of Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters support prioritizing wind and solar power, highlighting the continuing differences between the two parties on energy policy. With Democrats gaining control of Congress and making progress in several state governments, they are expected to raise environmental standards for energy development while using clean-energy tax incentives, expanded transmission networks, and support for low-carbon power to drive the energy transition. Solar and wind power are among the most direct potential beneficiaries, supporting demand for solar modules, inverters, wind turbines, and related power equipment. However, renewable energy is intermittent, and generation does not always align with demand. Solar output is concentrated during the day, while wind generation depends on weather conditions, which may not match data centers’ need for reliable power around the clock.
Battery energy storage systems (BESS) and energy-management systems (EMS) are therefore key complements to renewable energy growth. By storing electricity during off-peak periods or when generation exceeds demand, then releasing it during peak periods or when renewable output is low, they can improve the use of clean energy and reduce grid-load fluctuations. This supports demand for batteries, power conversion systems (PCS), inverters, and energy-management equipment. Fuel cells could also benefit from the midterm election outcome. Unlike solar and wind, which depend on weather and the time of day, fuel cells can provide more stable, distributed power for data centers and reduce reliance on conventional grid supply. If carbon-emission rules become stricter, fuel-cell systems using green hydrogen or other low-carbon fuels could also offer a way to combine reliable power with emissions reductions. Overall, renewable generation, BESS, and fuel cells could form a complementary low-carbon power system, benefiting from rising data center electricity demand and the U.S. energy transition.
| Category | Related stocks |
|---|---|
| Wind power | GE Vernova (GEV), Vestas (VWS), NextEra Energy (NEE) |
| Solar power | First Solar (FSLR), Gigasolar (3691.TW), Brave Screen (6538.TW), Enphase Energy (ENPH), SolarEdge (SEDG) |
| Fuel cells | Bloom Energy (BE), Kao Li (8996), AcBel Polytech (6282.TW), Delta Electronics (2308.TW) |
| Energy storage | Fluence Energy (FLNC), Tesla (TSLA), LG Energy Solution (373220.KS) |
| Energy management | Delta Electronics (2308), Eaton (ETN), Schneider Electric (SU), Fluence Energy (FLNC) |
Democratic Policy Priorities Could Push CSPs Toward Behind-the-Meter Power, Supporting Related Stocks

Recent Democratic opposition to data centers has focused on the risk that rapid growth in large data centers will raise household electricity bills and place additional strain on public grids. Future regulations are therefore expected to focus more on whether data centers crowd out household electricity use, whether the public will be expected to pay for grid expansion, and whether developers can cover their own additional power needs. This could prompt CSPs to increase their share of self-supplied power through BYOG and BYOP models, supporting growth in behind-the-meter generation.
In this environment, generation equipment that can be deployed quickly is likely to be among the first to benefit. Grid interconnection and regulatory reviews can delay data center construction, making CSPs more likely to favor solutions that can be procured quickly and shorten the wait for power, including natural-gas turbines, fuel cells, and renewable energy. In addition, since Democrats place greater emphasis than Republicans on environmental protection and net-zero emissions, tighter reviews of data center emissions and environmental impacts could improve the competitive position of low-carbon fuel cells and renewable energy that can be deployed quickly.
Summary
The United States will enter a period of divided government after the midterm elections. Democratic control of Congress is likely to increase political resistance to additional military funding and continued U.S. military operations against Iran under the Trump administration. However, the two sides remain far apart on Iran’s nuclear program, economic sanctions, and passage through the Strait of Hormuz, so the conflict is expected to remain at an impasse in the near term. After the new Congress takes office in January 2027, budget pressure on the Trump administration is likely to intensify, increasing its incentive to pursue a diplomatic breakthrough. Oil prices are therefore most likely to fall in the first half of 2027 as the conflict with Iran eases. Among refined products, crude should first reflect the recovery in supply, while gasoline is likely to weaken as refining capacity recovers. Diesel may decline more slowly, supported by damage to Middle Eastern refineries, the time needed to restore capacity, and continued absorption of new supply by U.S. domestic demand and exports.
Meanwhile, Democratic policies toward data centers are increasingly focused on household electricity prices, pressure on the grid, and environmental impacts. Tighter regulation could delay some new projects in the near term, but existing projects scheduled for 2027 are likely to be less affected. The key issues are new capacity planned for 2028 and the regulations states eventually adopt. As CSPs are required to bear more of the cost of additional power, self-generation through BYOG and BYOP models, along with behind-the-meter generation, could be among the most direct beneficiaries. In the near term, fuel cells, solar and wind power, energy management, and energy storage could see continued demand growth, supported by their potential for rapid deployment, reliable power, and alignment with net-zero requirements.

