fiisual Biweekly Oil Report :Three Agencies See Crude Tightness Easing; Oil Falls on Post-Midterm Ceasefire Hopes, but Unabated Real-World Conflict Continues to Support Prices

fiisual Biweekly Oil Report :Three Agencies See Crude Tightness Easing; Oil Falls on Post-Midterm Ceasefire Hopes, but Unabated Real-World Conflict Continues to Support Prices

fiisual

2026/11/16

The three agencies' monthly reports agree that the global crude market is shifting from tightness toward looseness. The IEA notes that global supply rose by 2.3 mb/d in October, exceeding demand for the first time since the war began, and that inventories rose for the first time since June. The EIA expects stock builds to begin in 4Q26, with Brent falling below $90 in 2Q27 and averaging $86 in 2027. OPEC, though more optimistic on demand, concedes that non-DoC output growth and the recovery of OPEC+ production will ease the tightness. U.S. data show the same trend: commercial crude inventories have shifted from draws to builds, and Gulf exports in October recovered to roughly three-quarters of pre-war levels. The market price has already moved ahead of this expectation. After the November 3 midterm elections, the Democrats took control of both chambers of Congress; the market believes this limits President Trump's room to expand military action against Iran and raises the odds of a diplomatic breakthrough. Together with Trump's statement that there are no near-term attack plans, Brent fell from $111.2 on 11/2 to $95.98 on 11/14, a weekly drop of 13.69%, and on 11/10 Brent and WTI posted their lowest closes since late August. However, actual conflict has not cooled and will continue to support prices. Iran refuses to let enriched uranium leave the country, U.S.–Iran talks have made no substantive progress, ships attacked in the Strait of Hormuz in October reached 37, a wartime high, and the Houthis continue to attack Saudi energy facilities. On the Ukraine–Russia front, Ukrainian strikes have cut Russian refining capacity by about 30% from late October, limiting diesel exports. Even with the IEA releasing an additional 71 million barrels from stocks, U.S. distillate inventories remain low and refinery utilization is at 95.2%, keeping diesel tight. Overall, supply recovery and ceasefire expectations are downward forces, but talks are unlikely to break through soon and the geopolitical risk premium remains. Brent is expected to trade in a high range above $90 per barrel, with clearer room for decline only after U.S.–Iran tensions ease in 1H 2027.

Price Summary

11/02 Open11/14 CloseWeekly ChangeHighLow
Brent111.295.98-13.69 %112.189.37
WTI102.387.29-14.67 %102.584.41
OPEC Basket103.3187.79-15.02 %103.3186.02

Week 1: Oil fell sharply early on post-midterm ceasefire hopes, then rebounded slightly as fighting showed no clear easing

  • Early in the week, oil fell sharply as the market began pricing in that, if the Democrats win control of Congress, the Trump administration's room for policy action will be further constrained, raising the likelihood that it seeks a diplomatic breakthrough and U.S.–Iran negotiations. At the same time, military confrontation had not noticeably eased. On 11/02, Iranian President Pezeshkian said the Supreme Leader had authorized the government to pursue peace talks under certain conditions, and Qatar continued to relay proposals between the U.S. and Iran. However, U.S. officials confirmed that U.S. forces carried out defensive strikes on some targets on Qeshm Island and around the Strait of Hormuz, saying the aim was to stop Iran from using the military facilities there to attack commercial ships. In the Red Sea, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of attacking a port on Yemen's Red Sea coast, setting a vessel on fire. Meanwhile, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces said the Houthis attacked a medical center in Lahij province near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, killing at least five, showing that Yemen's civil war and Red Sea security continue to deteriorate. China announced it would send a special envoy to Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia in early-to-mid November to help ease regional tensions. On 11/03, oil slipped slightly as senior Iranian officials told Reuters that the two sides remain far from ending the war and that Tehran will not accept the "excessive demands" from the U.S. Iranian parliament speaker Qalibaf also said Iran had given the U.S. a firm and reasonable response and that it is now up to Washington to decide. This cooled the market's hopes from the previous day of a quick breakthrough in talks. On shipping, attack risk in the Strait of Hormuz remains high; two significant incidents reported by the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) show targets now include both tankers and general commercial vessels. On the Russia–Ukraine front, Ukrainian drones attacked Russia's Slavneft-YANOS refinery in Yaroslavl. The regional governor said refinery infrastructure was damaged and a fire broke out, injuring two employees. The refinery, about 250 km northeast of Moscow, is one of Russia's key refining facilities and has been attacked before. Meanwhile, Russia launched large-scale missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities in Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and elsewhere.
  • Mid-week, on 11/04 the Democrats' big win in the U.S. midterms raised expectations of de-escalation, and oil plunged more than 8%. The results gave the Democrats control of both the House and Senate; the market believes the shift in congressional power may limit the Trump administration's room to further expand military action against Iran and increase the chance of ending the war diplomatically. Trump said the U.S. has no immediate plans to attack Iran and acknowledged that the Iran war and the resulting rise in energy prices were among the factors in the Republican election losses. The market therefore cut the probability of a near-term U.S. military expansion and expects the White House may push harder for a ceasefire or negotiations. However, Democratic control of Congress does not mean the president immediately loses foreign-policy and military decision-making authority; the president can still pursue foreign policy through the executive branch and commander-in-chief powers. The market's downward revision of escalation risk thus mainly reflects higher political costs, not an end to the military conflict. Diplomatically, Qatar stepped up mediation, but Iranian officials said the U.S. and Iran remain far from a peace agreement. While the market hopes the changed U.S. political environment can advance talks, the two sides remain divided over sanctions, the nuclear program, the maritime blockade and war reparations. On supply, Reuters reported that October Persian Gulf crude exports recovered to about 17.1 million b/d, roughly three-quarters of pre-war levels. This shows some exports are gradually resuming, but a gap of about one quarter from normal remains. The UAE is also considering building a third crude pipeline to reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz; if built, it would help increase the UAE's ability to export crude through other ports, though it cannot add alternative export volumes in the short term. On U.S. inventories, the EIA reported that commercial crude stocks fell by about 865,000 barrels for the week, in line with market expectations. Although the draw lends some support to prices, the market that day was driven mainly by U.S. politics and expectations for U.S.–Iran talks.
  • Late in the week, Ukraine–Russia, U.S.–Iran and Red Sea conflicts continued and oil edged higher. On 11/05, oil rose 3% on the day. UKMTO said at least five vessels had reported maritime security incidents since Sunday, with attack frequency close to the October high. Iran's Revolutionary Guard claimed two tankers and a tugboat caught fire after using unauthorized routes. In the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia issued a security alert around the port of Yanbu. The Houthis continued to attack Saudi Arabia and claimed an attack on King Fahd Airport in the east. In addition, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi spoke separately with his Saudi and Qatari counterparts about regional stability and diplomatic progress, showing that regional states are still trying to lower tensions through diplomatic channels. On the Russia–Ukraine front, Ukrainian drones apparently attacked Russia's Ryazan refinery. Reuters' video analysis indicated the facility may have been damaged in an overnight drone attack. If confirmed, it would be the second major Russian refinery attacked this week; the U.S. and Russia had previously reached an arrangement on Russian diesel exports, and successive refinery strikes may make it hard for Russia to meet both domestic fuel demand and its export commitments. On 11/06, oil closed slightly higher. Trump said he would soon decide whether to seek a peace deal with Iran or destroy Iran's remaining military capabilities. The remarks led the market to reassess whether the U.S. might take tougher military action after the midterms. Although the midterm results raised hopes for de-escalation, some analysts also believe the White House may use executive power more actively on diplomatic and military matters after the election. Eurasia Group cut its probability of renewed U.S. attacks on Iran from 65% to 60% but still sees military escalation as an important risk scenario; it lowered its estimate of a U.S.–Iran deal to 10%. This signals reduced market expectations for a near-term peace agreement, and a view that the two sides will find it hard to compromise on sanctions, the nuclear program and control of the Strait of Hormuz. On the Red Sea and Saudi front, the Houthis continued to threaten Saudi energy facilities and airports. The Iranian foreign minister also kept in contact with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others to try to prevent the conflict from widening. On the Ukraine front, President Zelenskiy said Ukraine would keep striking Russia's oil refining sector in response to Russia's continued attacks on Ukrainian power plants, energy networks, heating systems and water facilities. Zelenskiy stressed that if Russia stops attacking Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Ukraine is also willing to stop attacking Russian refineries. This shows that both sides' energy facilities have become an important pressure tool in the conflict.

Week 2: Oil fell early and mid-week as U.S.–Iran fighting eased, then recovered late as Middle East and Russia–Ukraine risks stayed elevated

  • Early in the week, easing U.S.–Iran hostilities pushed oil lower, but actual fighting in the Red Sea and between Russia and Ukraine did not stop. On 11/08, Trump said it is extremely unlikely the U.S. will attack Iran again as long as talks continue to progress, which pushed oil lower on 11/09. But Ukraine used drones to attack the Kirishi refinery in Russia's Leningrad region, starting a fire at the site; the governor said the fire was brought under control, and a civilian was killed by falling drone debris. The same day, the Houthis claimed to have attacked Aramco facilities in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with drones and missiles, and also claimed attacks on energy facilities in Abqaiq, in Saudi Arabia's eastern oil-producing region, and on Riyadh airport. On 11/10, U.S. officials signaled that no further military action against Iran is needed for now, easing market concerns about U.S.–Iran escalation; Brent and WTI fell to their lowest closes since August 31. However, Iran's top security official Mohsen Rezaei then said the U.S. and Iran are not currently negotiating, cooling the market's hopes for ceasefire progress. The same day, U.S., Russian and Ukrainian representatives began a new round of talks in Abu Dhabi, UAE, the first such talks among the three since February, covering prisoner exchanges, humanitarian issues and future security guarantees. The U.S. said the talks were constructive, but Russia and Ukraine remain deeply divided over territory: Russia demands Ukraine withdraw from four regions it claims sovereignty over, while Ukraine refuses to trade territory for a ceasefire. With no comprehensive ceasefire agreement, Russian energy and Ukrainian power facilities may continue to be attacked.
  • Mid-week, oil moved higher again on a lack of real progress in talks and continued attacks between Russia and Ukraine. On 11/11, Iran's top security official said Iran will not allow any enriched uranium to leave the country, sharply at odds with the U.S. position that the nuclear issue be included in initial talks, pushing oil higher. In addition, 37 ships were attacked in the Strait of Hormuz in October, a monthly wartime high; even if political talks progress, mine clearance, shipping insurance costs and whether shipowners are willing to resume sailing must still be considered, so crude transport may not return to normal immediately. The same day, Ukraine used drones to attack Ust-Luga, an important Baltic port in northwestern Russia, causing fires in the port area and damaging some oil product storage tanks and related facilities. The Ukrainian military said preliminary information shows five oil product tanks were damaged, with a total capacity of about 150,000 cubic meters, and that a related processing facility caught fire. Ust-Luga is an important Russian crude and product export port, with 2026 crude exports averaging about 562,000 b/d and product exports about 216,000 b/d, so the attack may affect not only refining and storage operations but also Russia's ability to export energy via the Baltic. On 11/12, the Houthis claimed to have used drones to attack a pumping station on Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline, oil facilities at Yanbu on the Red Sea coast, and Aramco facilities in Riyadh, lifting oil prices. The same day, the Iranian military said four tankers were hit by explosive attacks while transiting the Strait of Hormuz for failing to heed Iranian warnings.
  • Late in the week, Middle East and Russia–Ukraine risks stayed elevated, but an additional IEA stock release restrained the rise in oil. On 11/13, Trump said the U.S. does not necessarily need a deal with Iran to end the war, suggesting the U.S. may keep pressuring Iran through the naval blockade, economic sanctions and other measures rather than immediately resuming large-scale military attacks. Meanwhile, Iran still refuses to accept some U.S. demands on its nuclear program, so U.S.–Iran talks saw no clear breakthrough. The International Energy Agency (IEA) said member countries expect to release an additional approximately 71 million barrels of emergency oil and oil product stocks by the end of February 2027, at about twice the pace of September and October. About 15 million barrels will be diesel, mainly from French and German government stocks, with about 4–5 million barrels expected in January 2027 before tapering in February. Including previously announced release plans, total emergency stock releases could reach about 420 million barrels. The announcement was the most important new supply policy of the week, especially as the diesel release helps ease near-term supply pressure in the product market; however, it is a follow-on implementation arrangement of the existing emergency release plan and does not mean all 71 million barrels will enter the market on the day of the announcement. On 11/13, Ukraine used drones to attack the Volgograd industrial area in southern Russia, killing four and injuring two. The area is home to Lukoil's Volgograd refinery, and videos circulating on social media showed a large fire near the refinery, but Russian officials did not confirm the refinery was directly hit and Lukoil did not respond. Reuters, citing industry sources, said recent Ukrainian attacks on Russian refining facilities have cut Russian refining capacity by about 30% from late October. If equipment damage at the Volgograd refinery is later confirmed, it could further squeeze Russia's gasoline and diesel supply and export capacity.

This Month's Supply and Demand Forecasts from the Three Agencies

Unit: million b/dSupplyDemand
AgencyEIAOPEC (Non-DoC liquids + DoC NGLs)IEAEIAOPEC (OECD)OPEC (non-OECD)IEA
2025106.3 (+0.00)62.8 (+0.00)-104.4 (+0.00)46.30 (+0.10)59.2 (+0.00)-
2026101.69 (+0.59)63.6 (+0.00)-102.4 (+0.00)46.1 (+0.00)59.6 (+0.00)-
2027108.4 (-1.20)64.3 (+0.00)-104.4 (-0.20)46.6 (-0.10)61.6 (+0.00)-

EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, November 2026

  • Global oil prices and Middle East supply: The October Brent spot average was $124/bbl, up $10 from September and the third consecutive monthly rise, driven by continued global inventory draws, attacks on tankers in the Middle East and Black Sea, and higher freight rates from reduced tanker supply. However, with the reopening of Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline and increased ship-to-ship transfers off Oman, Middle East crude exports recovered slightly in October, and Brent fell below $100 on 11/4. The EIA estimates Strait of Hormuz closure-related production shut-ins were about 2.54 million b/d in October, forecasts about 2.52 million b/d in 4Q26, a decline to 1.9 million b/d in 1H27 and a further decline to 1.3 million b/d in 2H27. As Middle East crude transport gradually recovers, most Middle East production is expected to return to pre-conflict levels by the end of 2Q27, though Iranian exports will remain constrained. On global inventories, stocks drew an average 1.2 million b/d in 3Q26 and are expected to begin building in 4Q26, with builds in 1H27 reaching as much as 3.5 million b/d. Brent is forecast to fall below $90 in 2Q27 and to about $77 in 4Q27, reflecting that supply recovery and inventory rebuilding will gradually ease market tightness.
  • Global supply and demand: Global liquid fuels consumption, hit by supply disruption and higher prices, is estimated to fall by 2.0 million b/d in 2026, mainly from weaker demand in China and the Middle East, where reduced air travel and economic activity are also suppressing local oil consumption. As crude transport gradually recovers and prices fall, global liquid fuels consumption is expected to rise by 2.0 million b/d in 2027. On supply, Middle East production is expected to recover gradually, lifting global supply; in addition, U.S. crude production continues to grow, estimated at 13.9 million b/d in 2026 and rising to 14.3 million b/d in 2027, a record high. Overall, the market in 2026 remains affected by Middle East supply disruption, but with supply recovery and demand rebound in 2027, the global market is expected to shift from short-term supply tightness to inventory accumulation.
  • U.S. oil product prices and inventories: U.S. commercial crude inventories fell by 14.1 million barrels in October to about 410 million barrels, below the five-year range for the period, mainly due to lower crude imports and higher exports. Because the Brent–WTI spread has widened, U.S. crude exports remain attractive even after accounting for higher shipping costs. The EIA expects U.S. crude inventories to gradually rebuild in 2027, from 416 million barrels at end-January to 444 million barrels at end-December, driven by higher crude production, a recovery in net imports and slightly lower refinery inputs. In refining, damage to Middle East and Russian refining facilities has reduced global product export supply, keeping U.S. refinery crack spreads high; high crack spreads are expected to persist through most of 2027. In retail prices, the average gasoline price is forecast at $3.89/gal in 2026 and $3.73 in 2027; diesel at $5.25 and $5.03 respectively, showing that diesel prices, constrained by limited global product supply, fall by a relatively small amount.
  • U.S. crude production: U.S. crude production is estimated to rise from 13.7 million b/d in 2025 to 13.9 million b/d in 2026 and further to 14.3 million b/d in 2027, a record high. The growth will help increase U.S. crude supply and support inventory rebuilding in 2027. In addition, as Middle East supply gradually recovers, global demand for U.S. crude exports is expected to decline, and the Brent–WTI spread will gradually narrow.
  • Main revisions this month: For Brent, the EIA forecasts a 2026 average of $97/bbl and $86 in 2027, reflecting the support from Middle East supply disruption and tanker transport constraints. For products, retail diesel is forecast at $5.25/gal in 2026, up about 1.2% from the previous forecast of $5.19; for 2027 it is raised from $4.49 to $5.03, an increase of about 12.0%, indicating global diesel tightness may persist. Retail gasoline is forecast at $3.89/gal in 2026, down about 0.6% from the previous $3.91; for 2027 it is raised from $3.56 to $3.73, up about 4.7%. Overall, this month's forecast shows crude and product prices staying elevated.

IEA Oil Market Report, November 2026

  • Global oil prices and market rebalancing: The global oil market is showing signs of rebalancing; in October, global oil supply exceeded demand for the first time since the Iran war began, and crude prices fell noticeably. North Sea crude has dropped by more than 30% from its early-October high of $136/bbl to about $93 at the time of the report, mainly because continued recovery of Gulf exports eased supply tightness. However, crude is still about $22/bbl above pre-war levels, and continued tanker attacks and unresolved shipping security risks leave uncertainty about supply disruption. On products, European diesel prices fell about 11% over the same period but remain near $180/bbl, about 77% above pre-war levels, showing diesel tightness is still greater than in the crude market. Overall, although prices have fallen in the short term on supply recovery, Middle East shipping risks and the product supply gap will limit downside.
  • Global supply and demand: Global oil demand is estimated to fall by 2.7 million b/d in 2026 to 102.3 million b/d, then rebound by 2.0 million b/d in 2027. The decline is mainly due to disrupted Gulf exports of oil products and LPG and high fuel prices; the year-on-year decline in 4Q26 demand is forecast to narrow to 2.7 million b/d, below the average decline of about 4.4 million b/d in 2Q and 3Q. As supply chains gradually recover, petrochemical feedstocks are expected to contribute nearly 80% of demand growth in 2027; by contrast, high oil prices, global vehicle electrification and improved fuel efficiency will limit a rebound in road transport fuel demand. On supply, global oil supply rose by 2.3 million b/d in October to 105.4 million b/d, mainly thanks to the recovery of Gulf exports. Global supply is estimated to fall by 4.8 million b/d in 2026 and rebound by 6.6 million b/d in 2027 to 108.1 million b/d, with the Gulf and the five-country Americas group contributing about 5.3 million and 1.1 million b/d of the increase respectively. Overall, the global oil market is expected to return to surplus in 4Q26, with the surplus widening further in 2027.
  • Global refining and product markets: Global refinery throughput fell by 1.3 million b/d in October to 81.3 million b/d, a seasonal low, and is expected to recover to 84.7 million b/d in December. For the full year, global refinery throughput is estimated to average a decline of 2.2 million b/d in 2026, then rebound by 2.5 million b/d in 2027 to 84.3 million b/d. On refining margins, margins fell in most regions in October, mainly hit by record-high tanker freight rates, with Asian refiners especially affected by higher crude transport costs; U.S. refiners benefited from lower crude prices, but gasoline prices fell as well, partly offsetting the margin improvement from cheaper crude. On product supply, continued attacks on Russian energy infrastructure have obstructed diesel exports, compounding the gap caused by Middle East disruption. By contrast, Atlantic Basin refiners, especially U.S. refiners, continue to run at high rates to capture higher margins. If Asian crude supply improves, together with new product export quotas in China, Asian refiners are expected to raise runs, but recovery of global diesel supply will take time.
  • Global crude inventories: Global crude inventories rose by 52 million barrels in October, about 1.7 million b/d, the first increase since June, mainly driven by the recovery of Gulf crude exports. Oil on water rose sharply by 86 million barrels to the highest level since January, reflecting that although some crude has resumed exports, large volumes remain stuck in transit at sea. By contrast, onshore crude inventories continued to decline and remain at their lowest since at least 2016; OECD total stocks fell by 47 million barrels in October, of which industry stocks fell by 41 million barrels. Since the Iran war began, global crude inventories have fallen a cumulative 462 million barrels, showing that the earlier supply disruption has heavily drawn down the global inventory buffer. Overall, October's inventory rebound indicates supply recovery is beginning to show up in the market, but onshore inventories remain low, and if shipping is disrupted again the market could still face significant supply pressure.
  • OPEC+ crude supply: OPEC+ production recovered markedly in October, with total output rising from 35.71 million b/d in September to 37.72 million b/d, up about 2.01 million b/d. OPEC output rose from 21.89 million b/d to 23.83 million b/d, mainly driven by Saudi Arabia, up from 8.93 million to 9.99 million b/d, and Iraq, up from 4.06 million to 4.60 million b/d. Among non-OPEC producers, output edged up from 13.81 million to 13.89 million b/d, and Russian output rose from 8.52 million to 8.73 million b/d. Compared with the implied October targets, actual output of the OPEC+ 18 remains about 2.39 million b/d below target, with Russia about 1.22 million b/d below and Saudi Arabia about 480,000 b/d below, showing some producers remain constrained by capacity and production limits. Overall, although OPEC+ output has recovered with Middle East exports, actual supply has not fully reached target levels, and the pace of production recovery will be an important factor in the global supply–demand balance.
  • Main changes and outlook this month: The most important change in this month's report is that the global oil market is starting to shift from supply shortage to supply surplus. Global supply rose by 2.3 million b/d in October and inventories rose for the first time since June, showing that the recovery of Gulf exports has gradually eased supply pressure. On demand, global oil demand is estimated to fall by 2.7 million b/d in 2026; although it is expected to rebound by 2.0 million b/d in 2027, growth is concentrated in petrochemical feedstocks, while transport fuel demand remains weighed down by high prices and the energy transition. Looking ahead, if Gulf exports continue to recover and shipping remains normal, the global supply surplus will widen further in 2027, putting downward pressure on crude prices; however, tanker attacks and maritime security remain the main risks, and the diesel shortage could keep product prices relatively high. The IEA also noted that accelerating the release of emergency diesel reserves in the coming months will help fill the gap before global refining capacity and product supply recover.

OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report, November 2026

  • Global oil prices and market trends: International crude prices rose overall in October, with the OPEC Reference Basket (ORB) monthly average up to $112.12/bbl, $1.53 higher than September; the ICE Brent front-month futures average rose to $108.34/bbl, up $6.32 m-o-m; and NYMEX WTI rose to $96.94/bbl, up $1.25 m-o-m. The North Sea Dated Brent average rose $8.05 to $124.94/bbl, reflecting that Middle East supply disruption, constrained tanker transport and higher European refinery demand for North Sea crude continued to support regional crude prices. In futures markets, the main crude curves remain in backwardation, showing the market is still highly concerned about near-term supply, but as crude supply gradually improved in October, spreads between front-month contracts flattened slightly. Overall, geopolitical risk and transport costs continue to support oil prices, but improved crude supply in some regions has started to ease near-term market tightness.
  • Global oil demand: OPEC estimates global oil demand averaged 105.7 million b/d in 2026, up about 200,000 b/d from 2025; in 2027 it rises further to 108.3 million b/d, up 2.6 million b/d y-o-y, showing demand growth will accelerate markedly in 2027. Demand growth in 2026 is relatively modest, mainly due to uneven economic activity and oil consumption across regions; looking to 2027, continued global economic growth, increased transport activity and ongoing energy demand expansion in emerging markets will drive a rebound in oil consumption. Regionally, India's economic growth and transport demand remain strong and will continue to support non-OECD demand; China benefits from manufacturing, exports and policy support, with GDP growth forecast at 4.6% in 2026 and 4.5% in 2027. Overall, OPEC remains relatively optimistic on global oil demand, especially as 2027 demand growth will be markedly higher than in 2026.
  • Global oil supply and OPEC+ production: Liquids production of non-Declaration of Cooperation (DoC) countries is forecast to grow by 600,000 b/d in 2026 to 54.8 million b/d, led by Brazil, the U.S., Canada and Argentina; in 2027 it is forecast to grow by another 600,000 b/d to 55.5 million b/d, with growth coming from Qatar, Canada, Brazil and Argentina. Natural gas liquids (NGLs) and non-conventional liquids of DoC countries are forecast to grow by about 100,000 b/d in 2026 to 8.7 million b/d, and further to 8.9 million b/d in 2027. On OPEC+ supply, according to secondary sources, DoC crude production in October rose by 2.04 million b/d m-o-m to 41.23 million b/d; of this, OPEC member crude production rose by 1.97 million b/d to 27.16 million b/d, and non-OPEC DoC countries rose by 70,000 b/d to 14.07 million b/d. Overall, OPEC+ production recovered markedly in October, reflecting a gradual recovery of supply in some producers, while continued output growth from non-DoC countries will also be an important source of future global oil supply.
  • Global refining and product markets: Refining margins in major global markets generally declined in October, but with regional divergence. U.S. Gulf Coast refining margins, measured against WTI, averaged $56.35/bbl, down $5.73 m-o-m but up $37.89 y-o-y, showing tight product supply continues to support U.S. refining profits. Rotterdam refining margins in Europe, measured against Brent, fell to an average of $27.02/bbl, down $13.32 m-o-m, mainly due to higher feedstock costs, seasonally weaker gasoline demand and improved diesel supply expectations. Singapore refining margins in Asia fell further, averaging negative $3.33/bbl against Oman, down $2.45 m-o-m, showing Asian refiners still face constrained crude supply, high transport costs and weak regional margins. On throughput, U.S. runs in October fell by 247,000 b/d to 16.77 million b/d; throughput in major European refining areas fell by 388,000 b/d to 9.19 million b/d; and in parts of Asia fell by 339,000 b/d to 25.98 million b/d. Overall, differences in crude transport costs and regional supply conditions have caused clearly diverging global refining margins.
  • Global crude inventories: OECD commercial oil inventories in September fell by 14.6 million barrels m-o-m to 2,811 million barrels, 57.3 million barrels below a year earlier, 4.5 million barrels above the five-year average, but 156.2 million barrels below the 2015–2019 average. By composition, crude stocks rose slightly by 100,000 barrels to 1,353 million barrels, while product stocks fell by 14.7 million barrels to 1,458 million barrels, showing product draws remain the main cause of the OECD stock decline. Measured in days of forward cover, OECD commercial stocks in September fell to 60.3 days, down 0.3 days m-o-m and about 0.2 days below the five-year average. On U.S. inventories, total commercial oil stocks in October fell by 39.9 million barrels to about 1,204 million barrels, of which crude fell by 17.6 million barrels and distillates by 5.9 million barrels, showing U.S. crude and middle distillate supply remains tight. Overall, inventories in major consuming markets remain relatively low, especially as product stocks keep drawing down, making the market more sensitive to refining supply and transport disruptions.
  • Tanker shipping and freight costs: Tanker rates rose further in October, with the crude shipping market affected by limited route supply and tight vessel scheduling. Middle East–East Asia VLCC rates stayed high, and rates for West Africa–U.S. Gulf Suezmax and Mediterranean Aframax routes also rose markedly. On product shipping, some tankers shifted to the crude market to earn higher rates, reducing clean tanker supply and pushing clean tanker rates higher. In October, product freight rates east of Suez rose 30% m-o-m on average and west of Suez by 95%; the Middle East–East Asia route reached WS991, up about 25% m-o-m and nearly eight times the level of a year earlier. Overall, both crude and product shipping markets face tight vessel supply, and especially the rapid rise in product shipping costs will further raise feedstock procurement costs for Asian and European refiners and squeeze refining margins in some regions.
  • Main changes and outlook this month: This month's OPEC report maintains a positive view of global oil demand, estimating a modest 200,000 b/d increase in global demand in 2026, with growth widening to 2.6 million b/d in 2027. On supply, non-DoC countries continue to raise output and OPEC+ crude production rose markedly in October from the previous month, showing global supply is gradually improving. On prices, the OPEC Reference Basket and Brent averages rose in October, reflecting that Middle East supply risk and shipping costs still provide support; however, improved crude supply has pushed refining margins down in some regions. On inventories, OECD commercial stocks continue to fall, with product draws especially pronounced, and low diesel stocks also make the product market more sensitive to supply disruptions. Looking ahead, global demand growth and low inventories will provide some support for oil prices, but non-DoC output growth, OPEC+ production recovery and gradual adjustment of shipping supply may ease market tightness; attention should remain on actual OPEC+ output, the pace of inventory rebuilding in major consuming countries, and whether tanker rates stay high.

U.S. Crude Data Update

Crude supply tightness is easing, but high refinery utilization shows diesel supply and demand remain tight

2026/11/062026/10/30
Inventories (million barrels)
Commercial crude (excl. SPR)414.4 (+4.7)409.8 (-0.8)
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)279.5 (-2.6)282.2 (-0.4)
Motor gasoline210.8 (+1.8)209.0 (-0.2)
Distillate103.3 (+4.1)99.3 (-3.5)
Production activity
Refinery utilization (%)95.2% (+0.7 p.p.)94.5% (+1.7 p.p.)
2026/11/152026/11/08
Baker Hughes rig count463 (+0)463 (+1)

According to the EIA's Weekly Petroleum Status Report, this review covers the two weeks of 10/30 and 11/06, compared against the changes in the two weeks of 10/16 and 10/23. U.S. commercial crude inventories (excluding the strategic reserve) rose from 410.6 million barrels to 414.4 million barrels, a two-week combined increase of 3.8 million barrels (-0.8 and +4.7 respectively), versus a combined decline of 5.0 million barrels in the previous two weeks (-3.1 and -1.9 respectively), a shift from consecutive draws to a build, with a large 4.7-million-barrel increase in the latest week. The size of the draws has narrowed week by week from 8.5 million barrels in the week of 10/9, indicating that crude supply–demand tightness is gradually easing. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) fell to 279.5 million barrels, a combined two-week decline of 3.0 million barrels (-0.4 and -2.6 respectively), a marked widening from the combined decline of 0.6 million barrels in the previous two weeks; the latest week's 2.6-million-barrel drop is the largest recently, indicating the U.S. is stepping up strategic reserve releases to supplement market supply. On products, motor gasoline inventories rose from 209.2 million barrels to 210.8 million barrels, a combined two-week increase of 1.6 million barrels (-0.2, +1.8), versus a combined increase of 0.9 million barrels in the previous two weeks (-3.0, +3.9); weekly swings have both narrowed clearly, indicating gasoline inventories are generally stable and supply and demand are not tight. Distillate inventories rose a combined 2.6 million barrels over two weeks (-3.5, +4.1), recovering to 103.3 million barrels in the latest week after dropping to a low of 99.3 million barrels, versus a combined increase of 0.2 million barrels in the previous two weeks (+1.7, -1.5). Weekly volatility has clearly increased; although the latest week saw a rebuild, inventories remain within a low range of only 99–103 million barrels and are still on the tight side overall. Refinery utilization rose from 92.8% to 95.2%, a combined two-week increase of 2.4 percentage points (+1.7, +0.7), versus a combined decline of 0.7 percentage points in the previous two weeks, turning from decline to rise and reaching a year-to-date high above 95%, indicating that refiners keep raising runs given the incentive of large diesel crack spreads, which also indirectly confirms that existing refining capacity still cannot fully meet end-user diesel demand. Upstream, the Baker Hughes rig count held at 463, a net increase of 1 rig over two weeks (+1, +0), versus a net increase of 3 in the previous two weeks (+1, +2), indicating U.S. shale drilling activity is flattening and short-term crude production has not changed significantly.

Overall, viewed on a two-week trend, the U.S. oil market shows a pattern of "crude shifting from draws to builds, accelerated SPR releases, stable gasoline, and diesel volatile but tight." The narrowing of crude draws week by week, and even a large build in the latest week, shows crude supply–demand tightness is gradually easing; gasoline inventories are broadly stable and not tight; distillate inventories, though volatile, remain on the tight side overall. In addition, refinery utilization remains at a high and is still growing, indirectly confirming that existing capacity is not yet sufficient to fully meet end-user diesel demand. Thus, as crude supply pressure eases, the market's focus continues to shift from crude to products, and diesel tightness remains the main factor supporting oil prices.

Key News and Developments

Oil Outlook After the Midterms: The New Congress Is Expected to Advance a U.S.–Iran Ceasefire, the Risk Premium Should Gradually Vanish and Oil Should Fall

After the November 3 U.S. midterm elections, the Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress while the Republicans retain the White House, creating a divided government. Although the president holds military command authority, defense budgets and supplemental war funding still require congressional support; if the Democrats oppose additional military funding, it would constrain U.S. munitions replenishment, logistics sustainment and long-term deployments, and Congress could add political pressure through oversight and war powers resolutions. Divided government will not necessarily force an immediate U.S. withdrawal, but it will make it harder for the Trump administration to prolong the war. U.S.–Iran talks have shown no substantive progress so far. Iran demands that the U.S. first lift the naval blockade, ease sanctions, release frozen assets and pay reparations, while refusing to give up highly enriched uranium and nuclear technology rights; the U.S. demands that Iran first guarantee safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, limit its enrichment capacity, deal with its highly enriched uranium stockpile and restore international inspections. The biggest divide is the sequencing of negotiations, with neither side willing to concede first, so even with mediation by Qatar and others, a ceasefire agreement remains hard to reach in the short term. On the other hand, if the U.S. sharply escalates military action, it risks retaliation from Iran and its proxies that could hit Middle East oil producers and energy facilities, raising its own war costs, so the incentive to escalate is likewise limited; in the short term, a stalemate of continued pressure alongside mediation is more likely.

As the war drags on, U.S. deployment, resupply and combat spending keep accumulating. After the new Congress takes office in January 2027, requests for supplemental military funding will face stricter scrutiny and political pressure will rise, giving the Trump administration more incentive to adjust its position and seek a negotiating breakthrough, and the two sides could gradually move toward a ceasefire. Once the Strait of Hormuz blockade is lifted and crude exports and shipping resume, the geopolitical risk premium will be given back, and the most likely timing for oil to fall is 1H 2027.

ScenarioDescriptionLikelihood
Oil falls in 1H27Trump chooses to keep the stalemate with Iran and is forced into talks after the new Congress takes office in January 2027 because he cannot secure additional funding to sustain the war, gradually eliminating the risk premiumHigh
Oil falls before end-2026The U.S. and Iran begin talks before the end of 2026, the Strait of Hormuz blockade is lifted and both sides end armed action, rapidly eliminating the risk premiumLower
Oil stays high beyond 1H27Trump chooses to escalate attacks on Iran before the new Congress takes office, causing the overall Middle East situation to spiral out of control and affecting Middle East crude supply overall; he remains hardline after the new Congress takes office in January 2027Lower

The global crude supply–demand gap has narrowed as supply rebounded in the third quarter and is expected to move closer to balance in the fourth. If U.S.–Iran conflict cools in 1H 2027 and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and Middle East crude exports recover, crude will return to oversupply and prices will face downward pressure. For gasoline, U.S. Gulf Coast production has gradually recovered and supply is relatively ample compared with diesel. Although inventories are still low, as crude supply improves and refining capacity recovers, supply pressure will gradually ease and prices should fall with crude. Diesel supply recovers more slowly. The Middle East war shut down or closed some refining facilities, cutting capacity by nearly half from the peak; even if shipping through the strait improves faster after a ceasefire and eases crude transport, restarting refineries, equipment maintenance and capacity recovery take time, so diesel supply cannot return to pre-war levels in step. In addition, new U.S. diesel supply has mostly been absorbed by domestic demand and exports and has not yet translated into an inventory rebound, so diesel prices still have stronger support and are unlikely to fall quickly in the short term even if talks begin.

Russia–Ukraine War: Peace Talks Deadlocked; Ukrainian Drone Attacks Raise Doubts Over Whether Russia Can Deliver Additional Diesel Supply

The Russia–Ukraine war has entered its fourth year with no end to the talks in sight. U.S.-mediated Russia–Ukraine talks were originally scheduled for November 10–11 in Abu Dhabi, but the two sides remain divided over key territorial demands. While talks stall, Ukraine's attacks on Russia's refining system have escalated again, casting uncertainty on the additional Russian diesel supply the market had hoped for. To push down diesel prices before the midterms, Trump announced on October 9 an agreement with Putin allowing Russian diesel to be exported to the U.S. and international markets, with Russia pledging 300,000 tonnes immediately and a further 500,000 tonnes in November. However, according to the Wall Street Journal, Ukraine had, under U.S. pressure, paused attacks on refineries until after the November 3 midterms, but within hours of the news emerging, the Novokuibyshevsk refinery in Samara region was hit by drones. The offensive has since expanded, with Ukrainian drones launching a large-scale attack on Leningrad region on the night of November 9, targeting Kirishi, Russia's second-largest refinery. Reuters, citing sources, reported that since late October, refining facilities affected by drone attacks account for about 30% of Russia's total refining capacity, covering the Ryazan, Yaroslavl and Volga regions. Some attacks have directly targeted diesel production lines, for example damage to the diesel hydrotreating unit at Novokuibyshevsk, though the extent of damage has not been independently verified. Once such secondary processing units are damaged, repairs often take longer than for simple crude distillation units, directly affecting diesel output.

Russia's diesel exports were already fragile. This year's Ukrainian attacks have idled large amounts of refining capacity in western Russia, and Moscow has imposed fuel export bans since April, of which the diesel ban was only later partially lifted. In the data, Russia's June diesel exports were under 1 million tonnes, versus about 2.5 million tonnes a year earlier. The IEA estimates that in the first eight months of this year, on average a Russian refinery was successfully hit by drones every three days. On this basis, the market has reason to doubt whether Russia has the capacity to deliver the additional exports. This is especially sensitive for the global diesel market. The IEA's November report noted that continued attacks on Russian energy facilities have obstructed diesel exports, compounding the gap caused by Middle East supply disruption; European diesel prices, though they have fallen, remain near $180/bbl. If Russia cannot increase supply as scheduled, the price relief hoped for from the U.S. easing of Russian diesel imports may be discounted, and diesel prices may stay high even as crude falls, consistent with the earlier judgment that diesel repairs lag crude. Overall, with no breakthrough in peace talks in sight and Ukraine continuing to pressure Russia's energy lifeline with drones, Russian diesel exports are unlikely to rise significantly.

Conclusion

Summary of the Three Agencies' Monthly Reports

The November 2026 monthly reports from the three agencies show that although October oil prices remained high, the recovery of Middle East exports has begun to shift the market toward looseness. The EIA puts the October Brent spot average at about $124, OPEC's ORB at $112.12, though Brent fell below $100 on November 4, and the IEA notes North Sea prices have dropped more than 30% from the early-October high of $136 to about $93. The EIA forecasts Brent at $97 for 2026 and $86 for 2027, but European diesel is still near $180/bbl, with supply tightness greater than in crude. On demand, the EIA and IEA expect declines of about 2.0 million and 2.7 million b/d in 2026 respectively and a rebound of about 2.0 million b/d in 2027, with the IEA seeing petrochemical feedstocks contributing nearly 80% of the increase, while OPEC is more optimistic, forecasting growth of 200,000 b/d in 2026 and 2.6 million b/d in 2027 to 108.3 million b/d. On supply, the IEA notes global supply rose by 2.3 million b/d in October, exceeding demand for the first time, with inventories rising for the first time since June; the EIA expects Strait of Hormuz-related shut-ins to fall gradually from 2.54 million b/d to 1.3 million b/d in 2H 2027; OPEC+ output also recovered by more than 2 million b/d in October; and U.S. crude production is projected to reach a record 14.3 million b/d in 2027. On refining and shipping, record tanker rates are squeezing Asian refining margins, with Singapore margins turning negative, while U.S. refiners maintain high runs and profits. Overall, all three agencies believe supply recovery will ease the tightness, but OPEC places more emphasis on the support from low inventories, and tanker attacks, shipping security, the diesel gap and actual OPEC+ output remain the main risks.

Summary of the Short-Term Crude Market

Oil recently fell sharply, with Brent dropping from $111.2 to $95.98, down 13.69% for the week, and WTI down 14.67% to $87.29. The main reason is that after the Democrats won both chambers of Congress in the 11/3 midterms, the market expects Trump's room to expand military action against Iran to be limited; oil plunged more than 8% on 11/4, and after Trump said there are no near-term attack plans, both benchmarks posted their lowest closes since late August on 11/10. But U.S.–Iran talks still show no substantive progress, Iran refuses to let enriched uranium leave the country, ships attacked in the Strait of Hormuz in October reached 37, a record, and the Houthis continue to attack Saudi facilities, so oil rebounded mid-week. On supply, Persian Gulf exports in October recovered to about 17.1 million b/d, around three-quarters of pre-war levels, and the IEA announced a further release of 71 million barrels of stocks by the end of February 2027, of which 15 million barrels is diesel. U.S. commercial crude has shifted to builds, but distillate inventories remain low and refinery utilization rose to 95.2%, keeping diesel tight. Ukrainian attacks have cut Russian refining capacity by about 30% from late October, further limiting its diesel exports. In the short term, neither U.S.–Iran nor Russia–Ukraine talks are likely to produce substantive breakthroughs, and the geopolitical risk premium is expected to continue supporting prices; Brent is forecast to trade mainly in a high range above $90 per barrel.

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